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:
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:
:
:
0O0

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
Arvilla wishes to correct an error made in her Statement of
Facts, page 10, and in Point II of her Brief, page 26. Arvilla was
incorrect in asserting that Roger was his mother's sole surviving
child.

Rather, Mrs. Mina Finlayson, testified she had three

children, two of whom were still alive, Roger and Marilyn.

(R-556)

At the time Arvilla's Brief was written, her appellate counsel
thought she had only had two children, Roger and Roland.
Roger's Statement of Facts attempts to establish that Arvilla
had substantial knowledge about the 2 "notes" however the testimony
of Roger and his mother show that not to be the case.

Mrs.

Finlayson said that the Hallmark "loan" was not any of Arvilla's
affair (R-541) and that the loan was between her son and her only.
(R-558)

Roger said Arvilla really never knew what was owed to his

mother and that it was none of her business. (R-698)

Arvilla had

no knowledge of the rent "note" and in fact thought any sums
advanced to be a gift (R-493) consistent with the monies given
Roger's brother Roland. (R-521-22)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN THE WAY IT
DEALT WITH THE "RENT NOTE" AND INCORRECT IN
THE WAY IT DEALT WITH THE "HALLMARK NOTE"
Both Roger and Arvilla agree that the trial court erred in the
inconsistent way it dealt with the two "notes" in question.
The thrust of Roger's argument is that the trial court had the
equitable power to include both notes as marital obligations and in
failing to include the rent "note/1 it abused its discretion.
Arvilla, on the other hand, argues that the trial court did not
have the power to include either "note" and in so including the
Hallmark

"note" it not only abused

its discretion

but also

committed errors in law.
Three separate and distinct errors were committed by the trial
court in its handling the "Hallmark Note."

First, it determined

that the debt was marital even though it was incurred by Roger, 2
years before the marriage, without any involvement of Arvilla. In
addition, everyone admitted that Arvilla knew little if anything
about the alleged loan.
her affair.

Roger and his mother said it was none of

(R-541, 558, 698) The note which "surfaced" after 18

years was totally silent about the amounts allegedly advanced.
2

Conveniently, at the time of trial, what Roger said was an initial
$14,800.00 loan had grown to $40,553.74.

In spite of these

undisputed facts, the trial court found this to be a marital debt
on which both parties were obligated. This was highly inequitable
to Arvilla and an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Second, the trial court then imposed liability for one half of
that debt on Arvilla without allowing her the right to defend on
the merits of the claim.

In effect, a separate civil action was

allowed to be litigated and resolved in the divorce action to which
Roger's mother was not even a party.

To allow the divorce action

to be a vehicle for Roger's mother to secure a judgment against
Arvilla was clearly an error in law.
Third, assuming for the sake of argument only, that this debt
was a valid debt, the trial court not only affirmed the debt but
ruled that the parties' marital residence and cash was security for
the debt and required that the debt be paid from those sources. It
did this even though no security agreement ever existed.

This

amounted to converting an unsecured debt into a secured debt which
would be paid without Roger's mother ever having to file a lawsuit.
Simply put, the trial court collected a debt for Roger's mother
using marital assets, without giving Arvilla an opportunity to
defend on the merits.
For Roger to argue that this transaction should not be subject
to the same scrutiny as a commercial transaction because it is a
"family" transaction is simply specious.
3

If Arvilla is to be

charged

with

responsibility

for

one-half

of

a

$40,000.00

obligation, she is entitled to all protections afforded any debtor
from whom a creditor seeks recovery.
The flaw in Roger's argument that equity allows a divorce
court to do this is that equitable considerations are applicable
only as to the husband and wife involved in the action. Principles
of equity in divorce cases do not extend to third party creditors
such as Roger's mother was made out to be.
The trial court was correct in concluding that the rent note
should not be considered a marital obligation. It was incorrect in
concluding the "Hallmark note" was a marital obligation.

In the

case of either, Roger's mother can seek to recover what she thinks
is due her by filing her own independent action and Roger and
Arvilla can respond and raise such defenses as he or she may see
fit.
In summary, a divorce court is not a proper forum to allow a
third person, not a party to the action, to secure a judgment and
collect amounts the third person feels the divorce litigants may
owe him or her.
On page 23 of Roger's Brief, he states:
In short, there appears no substantial reason
to treat the "Hallmark Note" and "Rent Note"
in a different manner as equity requires
consistency of treatment. Id.
Arvilla agrees totally with this statement and asks this Court to
reverse the trial court's decision related to the Hallmark "Note."
4

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS RELATED TO THE VACANT
LOT IN SPITE OF ROGER'S ARGUMENTS TO THE
CONTRARY.
Contrary to Roger's argument in Point II of his Brief, Arvilla
did set forth in her brief all of the evidence in support of the
trial court's finding that the vacant lot adjacent to the marital
residence was not marital property.

The sum and substance of that

evidence amounted to the testimony of three most interested and
very aligned individuals; Roger, Roger's mother and Roger's son.
Each testified that the lot was never intended to be given to Roger
and Arvilla.

Conspicuously absent from Roger's evidence on this

issue is any documentary evidence or non-interested third party
testimony in support of Roger's position that the lot was not
marital property.
In accord with her responsibility on appeal, Arvilla did
marshall all of the evidence in support of that finding. (See page
24, Arvilla's Brief)

She then proceeded to set forth all of the

evidence which was against such a finding and in favor of a finding
that the lot was marital property.

That evidence consisted of

Arvilla's testimony, documentary evidence and undisputed facts
related to the parties' control and maintenance of this property
for over 13 years.

(See pp 24-26 of Arvilla's principal Brief.)

5

When viewed and taken as a whole, the evidence clearly weighs
in favor of a finding that the lot was marital property and should
have not been excluded from the marital estate•
Parenthetically, the practical effect of the trial court's
decision was to expand a regular divorce proceeding, involving only
Roger and Arvilla, into a quiet title action involving Arvilla and
Roger and Roger's mother.

In so doing, it granted Roger's mother,

a non-party to this action, relief which she could not have secured
without being required to file her own action.

In addition, the

action of the trial court effectively precluded Arvilla from
raising numerous defenses such as adverse possession, statute of
limitations, estoppel, laches and waiver.
As with the Hallmark note issue, the trial court improperly
merged separate independent actions into the divorce and granted
Roger's mother, a non party, relief that could properly only be
secured by her filing her own civil action against Roger and
Arvilla to set aside the deed and quiet title in her name.
The evidence, when viewed objectively, is overwhelmingly in
favor of a finding that the lot was marital property, having been
properly conveyed to Roger and Arvilla 13 years before the trial of
this divorce case.

The lot should have been included as part of

the marital estate.
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POINT III
ARVILLA IS ENTITLED TO BE REIMBURSED ALL OF
THE ATTORNEY'S FEES SHE WAS REQUIRED TO INCUR
BECAUSE OF ROGER'S RECALCITRANT BEHAVIOR.
Point III of Roger's Brief fails to address the basic question
raised by Arvilla - Was she entitled to be awarded $2,599.15 in
fees attributable to Roger's failure to cooperate during the
divorce

proceedings

when

there

was

no

evidence

offered

to

contradict the fact that those fees had been incurred and when
Roger's recalcitrance had been noted by the trial court?
Roger does not deny his actions/inactions related to this
recalcitrance as described on page 28 of Arvillafs Brief. In fact,
he admits his failure to cooperate.

(See page 16 of Roger's

Brief.) The trial court acknowledged that the evidence was strong
that he frequently did not carry out intentions.

(R-293)

The trial court recognized the uncooperative attitude of
Roger. The only evidence before the court as to the amount of fees
Arvilla was required to incur as a result of that uncooperative
attitude, was the unchallenged testimony of Ms. Donovan.

Given

this, the trial court was left with no other alternative than to
award Arvilla the entire $2,599.15 in requested fees.
To arbitrarily give her only $500.00 of that sum in the face
of that uncontradicted evidence is reversible error.

Arvilla

should receive an additional $2,099.15 in fees to reimburse her for
the fees she would not have had to incur had Roger not acted in
such a contrary way throughout these proceedings.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS MANNER AND COMMITTED ERRORS IN LAW
IN THE WAY IT CONDUCTED THE TRIAL AND REACHED
IT'S DECISION.
Point IV of Roger's Brief misses the point and thrust of
Arvilla's claim that the trial judge acted in an arbitrary and
capricious

manner

in

its

overall

handling

of

the

trial

and

rendering of its decision.
First, Arvilla wishes to reemphasize that she would request a
new trial on all issues, only if this Court does not reverse the
trial court's decision related to the "Hallmark note," the adjacent
lot and the $500.00 award of attorney's fees.

If this Court grants

the relief requested in Points I, II and III, of her principal
brief, that relief would be sufficient to allow her to withdraw her
request for a new trial before a different Judge.
In order for Arvilla to prevail in an appeal, she must show
that the trial court, in making it's distribution of property,
1)

Misunderstood or misapplied the law;

2)

Entered findings not supported by the evidence;

3)

Caused a serious inequity; or

4)

Acted arbitrarily and capriciously, so as to constitute

an abuse of discretion.

[See English v. English 565 P.2d, 409, 410

(Utah 1977).]
As

demonstrated

in

Arvilla's

principal

adequately rebutted by Roger, the trial court,
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brief

and

not

1)

Acted

inconsistently

in the way

it handled

the

two

"notes" and gave relief where it was not justified and imposed
burdens on Arvilla which were not legally enforceable.
2)
were

Entered findings related to the undeveloped lot which

clearly

contrary

to

weight

of

the

objective

evidence

presented.
3)

Enforced

significant

asset

an
from

unenforceable
the marital

obligation

and

estate, causing

excluded
a

a

serious

inequity to Arvilla and in effect giving Roger the "lions share" of
the marital estate.
4)

Blatantly

acted

arbitrarily

and

capricious

in

the

assigning of values to and distribution of the personal property of
the parties improperly forcing the parties to settle that issue
rather than entrusting their fate to the "flip of a coin."
The record, the statements of the trial judge from the bench
and the statements in his Memorandum Decision demonstrate that he
was inattentive and did not understand or properly apply the law to
the facts presented to him.

The arguments made in the Point IV of

Arvilla1 s

are

principal

brief

well

taken

and

have

not

been

successfully rebutted by Roger by claiming that such a division was
equitable and that the parties ultimately divided this property by
stipulation.
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POINT V
THIS COURT MAY DISREGARD ANY OR ALL OF ROGER'S
TESTIMONY BECAUSE HE TESTIFIED FALSELY ABOUT
HIS EXHIBIT 18
In the course of briefing, Appellant's counsel has discovered
a fact that calls into question the authenticity and validity of
Roger's Exhibit 18, the Hallmark "note",

(Page A-l Addendum to

this reply Brief) and the truthfulness of Roger's testimony about
that Exhibit,
During

trial, Roger produced

two

"notes" he

claimed he

prepared and signed and gave to his father on September 4, 1962,
and September 4, 1964, respectively.

(See Defendant's Exhibit's 18

and 19 included in the Addendum to Arvilla's principal Brief and
the Addendum to this Reply Brief.)

He testified he prepared and

signed Exhibit 18 on September 4, 1962. (R-581, 582)

He then

testified he did not see either of these notes until shortly before
the divorce was filed in December of 1990. (R-582)
testimony was different.
years ago,

She said she found these papers about 18

2 or 3 years after her husband's death, (R-561) and

that she had given them to Roger several years ago.
Arvilla,
authenticity

His mother's

during
of

the

the
two

course

of

trial

"notes" but was

not

(R-561-562)

questioned
successful

the
in

convincing the trial court that these notes were prepared in
anticipation of this litigation. (R-603) It has now become apparent
to Arvilla's counsel that Defendant's Exhibit 18 is not authentic
and had to have been prepared later in time and after the fact,
10

contrary to Roger's testimony.

This is the only conclusion that

can be reached because Exhibit 18, allegedly prepared by Roger on
September 4, 1962, contains two addresses. Both addresses have Zip
Codes of "84105."
This Court should take judicial notice of the fact that Zip
Codes were not adopted and implemented by the Postal Service until
July 1, 1963.

(See page i of U.S. Postal Service 1992 Book of Zip

Codes, included in the Addendum to this Reply Brief.)
The

document

itself

reveals

that

Roger

did

not

testify

truthfully and as such this Court can disregard any or all of his
testimony in resolving the issues raised in this appeal. [(See
Gittens v. Lundbercr. 3 Utah 2d 392, 284, P.2d 1115 (Utah 1955).]
Arvilla would respectfully request this Court to deny and
dismiss Roger's cross appeal and grant Arvilla all of the relief
she has requested.
POINT VI
ARVILLA
IS ENTITLED TO BE AWARDED HER
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS RELATED TO THIS
APPEAL.
In

arguing

that

neither

party

should

be

awarded

their

attorney's fees and costs related to this appeal, Roger fails to
demonstrate an understanding of the legal principles enunciated by
this Court and the Utah Supreme Court in relation to awarding fees
and costs in connection with the appeal of divorce cases.
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First, Arvilla agrees that Roger is not entitled to an award
of any fees ctnd costs on appeal because he has net requested them
and in fact has argued that each side should bear their own fees.
Second, it is a well established principle of Utah law that
when a party to a divorce action is required to appeal a trial
court's decision and successfully demonstrates that the trial court
committed substantial and prejudicial error requiring reversal,
that party is entitled to be reimbursed by the other party the fees
incurred on the appeal,

[See Bell v. Bell, 810 P. 2d 489, 494 (Utah

App. 1991); Grouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah App. 1991).]
In this case, Arvilla has demonstrated that the trial court
committed

errors

in

law,

made

an

unfair

and

inequitable

distribution of marital assets and liabilities and acted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner justifying a reversal of the trial
court's decision.

Having done so, she is entitled to be awarded

her fees and costs related to this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The responsibility of a trial court in divorce cases is to
fashion a property and debt distribution which is fair to both
parties.

In this case, the trial court's decision cannot stand in

that it is blatantly unfair to Arvilla, and not in accord with
existing Utah law as it relates to equitable distribution of debt
and property.

Arvilla respectfully requests this Court to award

her the relief requested on page 3 of her principal Brief; to deny
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the relief requested by Roger in his cross appeal and to award her
all of her fees and costs related to this appeal•
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

\C\

day of March, 1993.

DART. ADAMSON & DONOVAN
By_

/ V,<., .I.L>-_.L^
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Kent M. Kasting of Counsel
Sharon A. Donovan
Shannon W. Clark
Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Appellant
Arvilla Finlayson
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DATED this

day of March, 1993.
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Kent M. Kasting of Counsel
Sharon A. Donovan
Shannon W. Clark
Attorneys for
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& POST OFFICE
DIRECTORY
xpires December 3 1 , 1992

es I thru 3-1373 are Copyright © 1992 United States Postal Service and published by permission.
ed States Postal Service, U.S. Mail. First-Class Mail, Express Mail, Express Mail Custom Designed
'ice. Express Mail Same Day Airport Service, and ZIP Code are registered trademarks or service
<s of the United States Postal Service. (For a complete list of trademarks and service marks see
Domestic Mail Manual, Section 119—TRADEMARKS, SERVICE MARKS and COPYRIGHTS.)
Directory is published by MB Ltd. Services, Inc., a company which holds a non-exclusive license from
nited States Postal Service to publish and sell this National Five Digit ZIP Code* and Post Office Directory
td. Services, Inc , is located at 10014 Dallas Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland 20901. Questions concerning
irectory can be answered by calling (301) 565*2539. You may call Monday through Friday, except Federal
lys, between the hours of 9:00 a.m. through 5:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Postal Service publishes the National Five-Digit ZIP Code and Post Office Directory annually to famish customers
and U.S. Postal Service personnel correct and currentfive-digitZIP Code and mailing information.
This directory contains complete information relating to the five-digit ZIP Code system and Information required by the
mailer concerning U.S. Postal Service facilities and organization,
The five-digit ZIP (Zone Improvement Plan) Code was introduced to the public July 1 • t963 and was viewed as a positive step
for improving the productivity of mail distribution during a period of escalating mail volume and expanding delivery stops.
Additionally, five-digit ZIP Code areas lend themselves to a broad variety of other applications, including geographic and
demographic utilization,
Currently, 98% of all First-Class Mail bears a ZIP Code. ZIP Codes support the distribution of letters and other types of mail to
40,000 post offices, stations, and branches serving approximately 117 million homes, farms, and businesses across the nation.
It is extremely important that all mailers obtain a current edition of this publication in order to have the accuratefive-digitZIP
Code information for any address in the nation.
Five-digit ZIP Code information may also be obtained by calling the main post office in your local area.

HOW TO FIND A FIVE-DIGIT ZIP CODE® IN THIS DIRECTORY
The following instructions and sample page layout (p. 3-2) will help you find the correct five-digit ZIP Code for mailing
addresses.
FOR MOST POST OFFICES
1. TURNto Section 3, STATE LIST OF POST OFFICES AND POST OFFICES WITH STREET LISTINGS, and find the state
in alphabetical order.
2. FIND the post office in alphabetical order within the state.
3. If a post office has more than onefive-digitZIP Code, you will find A "SEE PAGE11 reference followed by a page number.
These post offices' listings are in the following order
A. Post office boxes at main offices, stations, and branches
B. Rural routes and/or highway contracts
C Postmaster and general delivery
D. Apartments, hotels, buildings, governmental offices, etc,
E. Named streets*
F. Numbered streets*
4. FIND the entry of the address for which you need afive-digitZIP Code,
3. COPYxht five-digit ZIP Code that appears betide the entry.
For more detailed information on symbols and definitions, refer to section 3, STATE LIST OF POST OFFICES AND POST
OFFICES WITH STREET LISTINGS
'Some streets h*vc only one entry, indicating that all addrettcs on the street have the ume ZIP Code* Other •trctti have two or more entries, each followed by the
rtftfe of house numben included by a tjv«n ZIP Code. In tome instances, thefinalentry for t street hat a house number, followed by the word "out," This metni that
the number shown and all higher numbers for that street have the Indicated ZIP Code.
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